In this paper axioms for values of games with denumerably many players are introduced and, on a certain space of games, a value is defined as a limit of values of finite games. Further, some relationships between the value that the topology on the space of games of bounded variation are investigated. It is also shown and the regular weighted majority games are members of the space on which the value is defined.
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Artstein, Z. Values of games with denumerably many players. Int J Game Theory 1, 27–37 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753432
- Economic Theory
- Game Theory
- Bounded Variation
- Weighted Majority
- Majority Game