International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 73–80 | Cite as

Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

  • R. B. Myerson


Selten's concept of perfect equilibrium for normal form games is reviewed, and a new concept of proper equilibrium is defined. It is shown that the proper equilibria form a nonempty subset of the perfect equilibria, which in turn form a subset of the Nash equilibria. An example is given to show that these inclusions may be strict.


Nash Equilibrium Normal Form Economic Theory Game Theory Nonempty Subset 
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  1. Kakutani, S.: A Generalization of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem. Duke Mathematical Journal8, 1941, 457–459.Google Scholar
  2. Nash, J.F.: Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics54, 1951, 286–295.Google Scholar
  3. Selten, R.: Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory4, 1975, 25–55.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1978

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. B. Myerson
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate School of ManagementNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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