Public Choice

, Volume 26, Issue 1, pp 1–18 | Cite as

Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles

  • William V. Gehrlein
  • Peter C. Fishburn


Public Finance Preference Profile Anonymous Preference 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1974

Authors and Affiliations

  • William V. Gehrlein
  • Peter C. Fishburn
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management Science and Organizational Behavior, College of Business AdministrationThe Pennsylvania State UniversityUSA

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