Public Choice

, Volume 14, Issue 1, pp 19–42 | Cite as

The control of politicians: An economic model

  • Robert J. Barro

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References

  1. Barro, R. J. “Inflationary Finance and the Welfare Cost of Inflation,”J. Polit. Econ., 80, Sept. – Oct. 1972.Google Scholar
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  5. Downs, A.An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, 1957.Google Scholar
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  7. Niskanen, W. A.Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago, 1971.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1973

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert J. Barro
    • 1
  1. 1.Brown University and The University of ChicagoUSA

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