De Economist

, Volume 144, Issue 1, pp 101–126 | Cite as

Book reviews

  • Jack Vromen
  • J. A. Kregel
  • Lex Hoogduin
  • John Groenewegen
  • Frank den Butter
  • Ed Westerhout
  • Hans Groeneveld
  • Jakob de Haan
  • S. K. Kuipers
  • Gerrit Meijer
  • Robert C. G. Haffner
  • F. Hartog
  • Peter A. G. van Bergeijk
  • V. R. Okker
  • Angelien Kemra
Article

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Cukierman, A. (1994), ‘Commitment through Delegation, Political Influence and Central Bank Independence,’ in: J.A.H. de Beaufort Wijnholds, S.C.W. Eijffinger and L.H. Hoogduin (eds.),A Framework for Monetary Stability, Dordrecht/Boston/London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 55–74.Google Scholar
  2. Goodhart, C.A.E. (1994), ‘Game Theory for Central Bankers: A Report to the Governor of the Bank of England,'Journal of Economic Literature, 32, pp. 101–114.Google Scholar
  3. Haan, J. de and S.C.W. Eijffinger (1994),De politieke economie van centrale bank onafhankelijkheid, Rotterdamse Monetaire Studies, Groningen, Wolters-Noordhoff.Google Scholar

References

  1. Wegberg,M.van, A.vanWitteloostuyn and M.RoscamAbbing (1994), ‘Multimarket and Multiproject Collusion: Why European Integration May Reduce Intra-community Competition,'De Economist, 142, pp. 253–285.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jack Vromen
  • J. A. Kregel
  • Lex Hoogduin
  • John Groenewegen
  • Frank den Butter
  • Ed Westerhout
  • Hans Groeneveld
  • Jakob de Haan
  • S. K. Kuipers
  • Gerrit Meijer
  • Robert C. G. Haffner
  • F. Hartog
  • Peter A. G. van Bergeijk
  • V. R. Okker
  • Angelien Kemra

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations