Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
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The purpose of this paper is to extend a modified version of a recent result of Vande Vate (1989) which characterizes stable matchings as the extreme points of a certain polytope. Our proofs are simpler and more transparent than those of Vande Vate.
Key wordsMatchings stability extreme points polytope
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