European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 33–51 | Cite as

Institutional law and economics

  • A. Allan Schmid


Behavioral economics provides one of the foundation for institutional law and economics (ILE). Improvement in predicting the performance of alternative laws will be built on ILE insights into how distribution affects productivity of labor and realization of joint gains. Our understanding of obedience to law as well as other categories of failure to be opportunistic (such as in high exclusion-cost situations) will be better understood from an ILE perspective that investigates learning to supplement specific sanctions.

The boundaries of ILE inquiry encompass private property rights, regulation, and public spending and taxation since these are complements and substitutes. Public spending is not a good measure of the size of government, and regulation is not the opposite of freedom in the aggregate. This framework of ILE can usefully be seen as distinctive, even if all of its practitioners do not use the label and several of its propositions are shared with other paradigms. A better label might simply be institutional economics or political economy.


Political Economy Public Finance Good Measure European Integration Private Property 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • A. Allan Schmid
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural HallMichigan State UniversityEast Lansing

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