Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 4, Issue 2, pp 117–133

Individual strategies in a market entry game

  • Amnon Rapoport
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF01410098

Cite this article as:
Rapoport, A. Group Decis Negot (1995) 4: 117. doi:10.1007/BF01410098

Abstract

Quantitatively trained Ph.D. students participated in three replications of a 20-trial market entry game in which each agent has two pure strategies—to “enter the market” or “stay out of the market”—and the individual payoff depends on the size of the set of active agents entering the market. With experience, subjects adhered more strictly to pure strategies, which although markedly different from one to the other combined to form distributions supporting a Nash equilibrium solution to the game.

Key Words

market entry Nash equilibrium noncooperative games coordination 

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amnon Rapoport
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Business AdministrationUniversity of ArizonaTucson

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