Empirica

, Volume 20, Issue 3, pp 221–240 | Cite as

Private and public sector regulation of competitively tendered contracts

  • Simon Domberger
  • David Hensher
Article

Abstract

This paper addresses two contractual issues using a sample of competitively tendered contracts for cleaning services. First, the paper considers the characteristics that distinguish private from public sector organisations in their methods of selection and regulation of contractors. Secondly, the paper examines the perceived effectiveness of such regulatory mechanisms in terms of compliance with contract specifications and overall assessment of quality. Econometric analysis reveals that private sector organisations differ from their public sector counterparts in the selection procedures of contractors. Moreover, significant differences emerge in the apparent efficacy of a range of regulatory instruments in assuring contractual performance.

Key Words

competitive tendering contracts outsourcing 

JEL-Codes

L33 L50 L84 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Simon Domberger
    • 1
  • David Hensher
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate School of BusinessUniversity of SydneyAustralia

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