Population and Environment

, Volume 12, Issue 3, pp 285–296

The tragedy of the commons that wasn't: On technical solutions to the institutions game

  • Carl J. Dahlman
Article

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Copyright information

© Human Sciences Press, Inc. 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carl J. Dahlman
    • 1
  1. 1.Mid-America Institute for Public PolicyChevy ChaseUSA

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