Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 6, Issue 3, pp 233–245 | Cite as

Evolutionary stability of social norms in a socioeconomic equilibrium model

  • Hans Peter Grüner


A hybrid of a model of economic equilibrium in two markets and a social game is formed. The link between the two is established through a social norm that conditions correct social behavior on economic variables and therefore distorts the economic equilibrium allocation. The initial endowment of an individual determines whether she gains from a social norm. The evolution of norms is examined in a dynamic model where norms are more likely to persist if they deliver higher utility to their believers. Also it is assumed that norms lose importance when they are disobeyed by their believers. Optimally coordinating norms are not necessarily evolutionarily stable, and a suboptimal norm can be the outcome of the evolutionary process.

JEL classification

A12 A13 D10 D61 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hans Peter Grüner
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Economics and StatisticsUniversity of KonstanzKonstanzGermany
  2. 2.DELTAParis

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