Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 6, Issue 2, pp 127–137 | Cite as

Constitutional politics within the interest-group model

  • Daniel Sutter


I examine constitutional politics using the interest-group model of politics. Constitutional economics argues that rent seeking is inevitable in majoritarian democracy and genuine reform is possible only at the constitutional level. By implication the constitutional equilibrium must differ from the political equilibrium. I examine reasons that such a difference might exist but find weak prospects for a general-interest victory over the special interest in constitutional politics. Although implicit constitutional change (for example, through Supreme Court reinterpretation) and explicit violation are substitute means of altering the constitution, the former dominates the latter. This suggests that a third factor participates in constitutional politics in addition to the general and special interests, which is support for the Constitution itself. Effective rules to restrain rent seeking need to ensure the congruence of the constitutional and general interests.


Special Interest General Interest Constitutional Level Rent Seek Political Equilibrium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Sutter
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of OklahomaNorman

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