Effectivity functions and simple games
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Abstract
The rather new notion of effectivity function is related to the notion of simple game. Every effectivity function is associated with a simple game. So theory about simple games may be applicable to effectivity functions. E.g. if the effectivity function is additive, then the associated simple game is weighted. Via a characterization of weighted simple games it is possible to characterize maximal additive effectivity functions.
Finally we characterize additive effectivity functions and their associated simple games.
Key words
Effectivity functions simple games additive weighted k-trade robust asummability convex maximal monotonie strongly monotonie power preservingPreview
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© Physica-Verlag 1997