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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 223–227 | Cite as

Correlated equilibrium and potential games

  • Abraham Neyman
Article

Abstract

Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets which has a smooth concave potential, is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which maximize the potential. If moreover, the strategy sets are compact and the potential is strictly concave, then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium.

Keywords

Economic Theory Game Theory Pure Strategy Strategy Profile Strategic Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. Aumann RJ (1974) Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Journal of Mathematical Economics1: 67–96Google Scholar
  2. Liu L (1993) Correlated equilibrium of cournot oligopoly competition. To appear in Journal of Economic TheoryGoogle Scholar
  3. Monderer D, Shapley LS (1994) Potential games. To appear in Games and Economic BehaviorGoogle Scholar
  4. Rosenthal RW (1973) A class of games possessing pure-strategy equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory 2: 65–67Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Abraham Neyman
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute of MathematicsThe Hebrew University of JerusalemGivat Ram, JerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Institute for Decision SciencesSUNY Stony BrookStony BrookUSA

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