International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 26, Issue 1, pp 113–136 | Cite as

Order of play in strategically equivalent games in extensive form

  • Amnon Rapoport


“Can we find a pair of extensive form games that give rise to the same strategic form game such that, when played by a reasonable subject population, there is a statistically significant difference in how the games are played?” (Kreps, 1990, p. 112). And if yes, “can we organize these significant differences according to some principles that reflect recognizable differences in the extensive forms?” Both questions are answered positively by reporting results from three different experiments on public goods provision, resource dilemmas, and pure coordination games.


Public Good Economic Theory Game Theory Extensive Form Form Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amnon Rapoport
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management and PolicyUniversity of ArizonaTusconUSA

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