International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 21, Issue 3, pp 249–266 | Cite as

The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints

  • U. Faigle
  • W. Kern
Article

Abstract

Cooperative games are considered where only those coalitions of players are feasible that respect a given precedence structure on the set of players. Strengthening the classical symmetry axiom, we obtain three axioms that give rise to a unique Shapley value in this model. The Shapley value is seen to reflect the expected marginal contribution of a player to a feasible random coalition, which allows us to evaluate the Shapley value nondeterministically. We show that every exact algorithm for the Shapley value requires an exponential number of operations already in the classical case and that even restriction to simple games is #P-hard in general. Furthermore, we outline how the multi-choice cooperative games of Hsiao and Raghavan can be treated in our context, which leads to a Shapley value that does not depend on pre-assigned weights. Finally, the relationship between the Shapley value and the permission value of Gilles, Owen and van den Brink is discussed. Both refer to formally similar models of cooperative games but reflect complementary interpretations of the precedence constraints and thus give rise to fundamentally different solution concepts.

Key words

Cooperative Game Shapley Value Precedence Constraint Marginal Contribution 

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • U. Faigle
    • 1
  • W. Kern
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Applied MathematicsUniversity of TwenteAE EnschedeThe Netherlands

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