International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 18, Issue 1, pp 57–89 | Cite as

Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non-observable actions

  • E. Lehrer
Article

Abstract

We characterize, by the one-shot game terms, the set of lower equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted repeated game with non-observable actions.

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References

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • E. Lehrer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of ManagementNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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