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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 23, Issue 1, pp 75–83 | Cite as

Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities

  • Jinpeng Ma
Research Articles

Abstract

We show that, in markets with indivisibilities (typified by the Shapley-Scarf housing market), the strict core mechanism is categorically determined by three assumptions: individual rationality, Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness.

Key words

Shapley-Scarf Housing Market strict core mechanism individual rationality Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness 

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References

  1. [1]
    Bird CG (1984) Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics Letters 14: 309–313Google Scholar
  2. [2]
    Postlewaite A, Roth AE (1977) Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics 4: 131–137Google Scholar
  3. [3]
    Roth AE (1982) Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics letters 9: 127–132Google Scholar
  4. [4]
    Shapley LS, Scarf H (1974) On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1: 23–37Google Scholar
  5. [5]
    Wako J (1991) Some properties of weak domination in an exchange market with indivisible goods. The Economic Studies Quarterly 42(4): 303–314Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jinpeng Ma
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsSUNYStony BrookUSA

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