Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
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We show that, in markets with indivisibilities (typified by the Shapley-Scarf housing market), the strict core mechanism is categorically determined by three assumptions: individual rationality, Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness.
Key wordsShapley-Scarf Housing Market strict core mechanism individual rationality Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness
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