International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 20, Issue 1, pp 13–22 | Cite as

On the strong monotonicity of power indices

  • E. Sagonti
Article

Summary

The problem of choosing a power index which better describes a control situation could be solved by the property of strong monotonicity. We prove this property for some of the best known power indices.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Driessen BH (1985) Contribution to the Theory of Cooperative Games: the τ value andk-convex games. PHD Thesis, Catholic University of Nijemegen.Google Scholar
  2. Gambarelli G (1983) Common Behaviour of Power Indices. Int J of Game Theory 12: 237–244.Google Scholar
  3. Lehrer E (1988) An Axiomatisation of the Banzhaf Value. Int J of Game Theory 17: 89–99.Google Scholar
  4. Owen G (1975) Multilinear Extensions and the Banzhaf Value. Naval Research Logistic Quarterly, pp 741–750.Google Scholar
  5. Owen G (1978) Characterisation of the Banzhaf-Coleman Index. SIAM J for Applied Math, vol. 35 no 2, pp 315–327.Google Scholar
  6. Owen G (1982) Game Theory, 2nd ed. Academic Press, New York.Google Scholar
  7. Shapley LS (1953) A value for n-person games. In contribution to the Theory of games, Annals of Mathematic Studies, vol. 28. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, pp 307–317.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • E. Sagonti
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Quantitative MethodsUniversity of BresciaBresciaItaly

Personalised recommendations