International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 24, Issue 2, pp 187–212 | Cite as

On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games

  • John Van Huyck
  • Raymond Battalio
  • Sondip Mathur
  • Patsy Van Huyck
  • Andreas Ortmann
Games and Experiments

Abstract

We use a dynamical systems approach to model the origin of bargaining conventions and report the results of a symmetric bargaining game experiment. Our experiment also provides evidence on the psychological salience of symmetry and efficiency. The observed behavior in the experiment was systematic, replicable, and roughly consistent with the dynamical systems approach. For instance, we do observe unequal-division conventions emerging in communities of symmetrically endowed subjects.

Key words

convention symmetry bargaining dynamical systems adaptive learning human behavior 

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Van Huyck
    • 1
  • Raymond Battalio
    • 1
  • Sondip Mathur
    • 1
  • Patsy Van Huyck
    • 1
  • Andreas Ortmann
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Economics, College of Liberal ArtsTexas A&M UniversityCollege StationUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsBowdoin CollegeBrunswickUSA

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