Journal of Evolutionary Economics

, Volume 4, Issue 3, pp 207–226 | Cite as

Collective learning, innovation and growth in a boundedly rational, evolutionary world

  • Gerald Silverberg
  • Bart Verspagen


We formulate a simple multiagent evolutionary scheme as a model of collective learning, i.e. a situation in which firms experiment, interact, and learn from each other. This scheme is then applied to a stylized endogenous growth economy in which firms have to determine how much to invest in R&D, where innovations are the stochastic product of their R&D activity, spillovers occur, but technological advantages are only relative and temporary and innovations actually diffuse, both at the intra and interfirm levels. The model demonstrates both the existence of a unique long-run growth attractor (in the linear case) and distinct growth phases on the road to that attractor. We also compare the long-run growth patterns for a linear and a logistic innovation function, and produce some evidence for a bifurcation in the latter case.

Key words

Economic growth Innovation Market structure Learning Bounded rationality 


L20 O31 O33 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerald Silverberg
    • 1
  • Bart Verspagen
    • 1
  1. 1.Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and TechnologyUniversity of LimburgMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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