On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach
We provide an elementary proof showing how in economies with an arbitrary number of agents an arbitrary number of public goods and utility functions quasi-linear in money, any efficient and individually rational mechanism is not strategy-proof for any economy satisfying a mild regularity requirement.
KeywordsUtility Function Public Good Economic Theory Simple Approach Arbitrary Number
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