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Economic Theory

, Volume 6, Issue 2, pp 365–371 | Cite as

On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach

  • Carmen Beviá
  • Luis Corchón
Exposita Notes

Summary

We provide an elementary proof showing how in economies with an arbitrary number of agents an arbitrary number of public goods and utility functions quasi-linear in money, any efficient and individually rational mechanism is not strategy-proof for any economy satisfying a mild regularity requirement.

Keywords

Utility Function Public Good Economic Theory Simple Approach Arbitrary Number 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carmen Beviá
    • 1
  • Luis Corchón
    • 2
  1. 1.Departamento de FundamentosUniversidad de AlicanteAlicanteSpain
  2. 2.Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas and Departamento de FundamentosUniversidad de AlicanteAlicanteSpain

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