A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
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In this note we provide a direct and simple proof of the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite action games when the payoffs depend on own action and the average response of others. The result is then extended to the case where the action set of each player is a compact subset of ℜn.
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