Empirical Economics

, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp 223–253

Expected utility theory and the experiments

  • Glenn W. Harrison
Article

Abstract

The experimental evidence against expected utility theo or unconvincing. When one modifies the experiments to mi tends to support traditional theory.

JEL-Classification System-Numbers

D81 C91 B41 

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Glenn W. Harrison
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics, College of Business AdministrationUniversity of South CarolinaColumbiaUSA

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