, Volume 41, Issue 3, pp 353–390 | Cite as

Iterated belief change based on epistemic entrenchment

  • Abhaya C. Nayak


In this paper it is argued that, in order to solve the problem of iterated belief change, both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation. It is shown that the operation in question satisfies generalized versions of the Gärdenfors revision postulates. The account offered is motivated by Spohn's ordinal conditionalization functions, and can be seen as the Jeffrization of a proposal considered by Rott.


Revision Operation Belief Revision Belief State Belief Change Conditionalization Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Abhaya C. Nayak
    • 1
  1. 1.Basser Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of SydneySydneyAustralia

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