, Volume 103, Issue 3, pp 303–325 | Cite as

A platonist epistemology

  • Mark Balaguer


A response is given here to Benacerraf's 1973 argument that mathematical platonism is incompatible with a naturalistic epistemology. Unlike almost all previous platonist responses to Benacerraf, the response given here is positive rather than negative; that is, rather than trying to find a problem with Benacerraf's argument, I accept his challenge and meet it head on by constructing an epistemology of abstract (i.e., aspatial and atemporal) mathematical objects. Thus, I show that spatio-temporal creatures like ourselves can attain knowledge about mathematical objects by simply explaininghow they can do this. My argument is based upon the adoption of a particular version of platonism — full-blooded platonism — which asserts that any mathematical object which possiblycould exist actuallydoes exist.


Mathematical Object Naturalistic Epistemology 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark Balaguer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCalifornia State University, Los AngelesLos AngelesUSA

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