Beliefs and inferences: A test of a rational-emotive hypothesis 1. Performing in an academic seminar

  • Windy Dryden
  • Julia Ferguson
  • Tony Clark
Articles

Abstract

Subjects were asked to imagine that they were going to present an academic seminar. They were further asked to imagine (a) that they adhered to a rational belief or an irrational belief; (b) that they had made or had not made an effort in preparing for the seminar and (c) that their performance counted or did not count towards their final examination grade. Whilst in role, subjects were asked to make inferences about various aspects of their performance and the responses of others. While the results supported the hypothesis that imagining that one is holding an irrational belief leads to more negative inferences than holding a rational belief, it was also found that not making an effort in preparing for the siminar led subjects to make more negative inferences than making an effort. In addition, there were several two-way and three-way significant interactions between the independent variables. The results supported Ellis's (1985) recent formulation concerning the complex relationship between events and inferences (A), beliefs (B) and emotional and behavioral consequences of beliefs (C).

Keywords

Public Health Significant Interaction Behavioral Consequence Complex Relationship Final Examination 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Human Sciences Press 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Windy Dryden
    • 1
  • Julia Ferguson
    • 1
  • Tony Clark
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' CollegeUniversity of LondonNew CrossEngland

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