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Beliefs and inferences: A test of a rational-emotive hypothesis 1. Performing in an academic seminar

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Abstract

Subjects were asked to imagine that they were going to present an academic seminar. They were further asked to imagine (a) that they adhered to a rational belief or an irrational belief; (b) that they had made or had not made an effort in preparing for the seminar and (c) that their performance counted or did not count towards their final examination grade. Whilst in role, subjects were asked to make inferences about various aspects of their performance and the responses of others. While the results supported the hypothesis that imagining that one is holding an irrational belief leads to more negative inferences than holding a rational belief, it was also found that not making an effort in preparing for the siminar led subjects to make more negative inferences than making an effort. In addition, there were several two-way and three-way significant interactions between the independent variables. The results supported Ellis's (1985) recent formulation concerning the complex relationship between events and inferences (A), beliefs (B) and emotional and behavioral consequences of beliefs (C).

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References

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  2. Ellis, A. (1985). Expanding the ABCs of rational-emotive therapy. In M. J. Mahoney & A. Freeman (eds.),Cognition and psychotherapy (pp 313–323). New York, Plenum.

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Author information

Correspondence to Windy Dryden.

Additional information

Windy Dryden PhD is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. Julia Ferguson is Research Assistant in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. Tony Clark was an Undergraduate Student in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. He graduated in 1987.

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Dryden, W., Ferguson, J. & Clark, T. Beliefs and inferences: A test of a rational-emotive hypothesis 1. Performing in an academic seminar. J Rational-Emot Cognitive-Behav Ther 7, 119–129 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01076184

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Keywords

  • Public Health
  • Significant Interaction
  • Behavioral Consequence
  • Complex Relationship
  • Final Examination