Journal of Regulatory Economics

, Volume 5, Issue 2, pp 183–197

An optimal tax/subsidy for output and pollution control under asymmetric information in oligopoly markets

  • Jae-Cheol Kim
  • Ki-Bok Chang

DOI: 10.1007/BF01065365

Cite this article as:
Kim, JC. & Chang, KB. J Regul Econ (1993) 5: 183. doi:10.1007/BF01065365


This paper constructs an optimal incentive tax/subsidy scheme in an oligopoly market with pollution, as a generalization of the Loeb-Magat scheme, which is nondiscriminatory and requires less information for implementation than the conventional ones. Some interesting properties of the scheme are discussed.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jae-Cheol Kim
    • 1
  • Ki-Bok Chang
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management and PolicyKorea Advanced Institute of Science and TechnologyTaejonKorea

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