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Synthese

, Volume 94, Issue 3, pp 453–476 | Cite as

Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief

  • Thomas D. Senor
Article

Abstract

In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epistemic status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete.

Keywords

Important Objection Epistemic Status Phenomenal State Foundationalist Theory Memory Belief 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas D. Senor
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ArkansasFayettevilleU.S.A.

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