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Synthese

, Volume 94, Issue 3, pp 357–376 | Cite as

Epistemic normativity

  • Hilary Kornblith
Article

Abstract

This paper examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? A semantic approach to this question, due to Alvin Goldman, is examined and found unacceptable. Instead, accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires are argued to be most promising. All of these accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. It is argued that such an account may be offered, grounding our epistemic norms in desire, which nevertheless makes these imperatives universal. The account is contrasted with some recent work of Stephen Stich.

Keywords

Recent Work Normative Force Epistemic Norm Semantic Approach Hypothetical Imperative 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hilary Kornblith
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of VermontBurlingtonU.S.A.

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