Synthese

, Volume 94, Issue 3, pp 335–356 | Cite as

The two faces of Quine's naturalism

  • Susan Haack
Article

Abstract

Quine's ‘naturalized epistemology’ is ambivalent between a modest naturalism according to which epistemology is an a posteriori discipline, an integral part of the web of empirical belief, and a scientistic naturalism according to which epistemology is to be conducted wholly within the natural sciences. This ambivalence is encouraged by Quine's ambiguous use of “science”, to mean sometimes, broadly, ‘our presumed empirical knowledge’ and sometimes, narrowly, ‘the natural sciences’. Quine's modest naturalism is reformist, tackling the traditional epistemological problems in a novel way; his scientistic naturalism is revolutionary, requiring restriction and reconceptualization of epistemological problems. In particular, his scientistic naturalism trivializes the question of the epistemic standing of the natural sciences, whereas modest naturalism takes it seriously, and can offer a plausible answer.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. BonJour, L.: 1985,The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, and London.Google Scholar
  2. Cornman, J.: 1978, ‘Foundational versus Nonfoundational Theories of Empirical Justification’, in G. Pappas and M. Swain (eds.),Essays on Knowledge and Justification, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, and London.Google Scholar
  3. Goldman, A. I.: 1979, ‘What is Justified Belief?’, in G. Pappas (ed.),Justification and Knowledge, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 1–23.Google Scholar
  4. Goldman, A. I.: 1986,Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, and London.Google Scholar
  5. Guttenplan, S. (ed.): 1975,Mind and Language, Clarendon Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
  6. Haack, S.: 1975, ‘The Relevance of Psychology to Epistemology’,Metaphilosophy 6, 161–76.Google Scholar
  7. Haack, S.: 1982–83, ‘Theories of Knowledge: an Analytic Framework’,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LXXXIII, 143–57.Google Scholar
  8. Haack, S.: 1990a, ‘Rebuilding the Ship While Sailing on the Water’, in R. Barrett and R. Gibson (eds.),Perspectives on Quine, Blackwell's, Oxford, pp. 111–27.Google Scholar
  9. Haack, S.: 1990b, ‘Recent Obituaries of Epistemology’,American Philosophical Quarterly 27(3), 199–220.Google Scholar
  10. Hahn, L. and P. A. Schilpp (eds.) 1986,The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, Open Court, La Salle, IL.Google Scholar
  11. Kim, J.: 1988, ‘What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’?’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.),Philosophical Perspectives, 2: Epistemology, Ridgeview, Atascadero, CA, pp. 381–406.Google Scholar
  12. Putnam, H.: 1982, ‘Why Reason Can't be Naturalized’,Synthese 52, 3–23.Google Scholar
  13. Putnam, H.: 1986, ‘Meaning Holism’, in Hahn and Schilpp (1986), pp. 405–26.Google Scholar
  14. Quine, W. V.: 1953,From a Logical Point of View, Harper Torchbooks, New York and Evanston, IL.Google Scholar
  15. Quine, W. V.: 1953a, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in Quine (1953), pp. 20–46.Google Scholar
  16. Quine, W. V.: 1960,Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, and London.Google Scholar
  17. Quine, W. V.: 1969,Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Colombia University Press, New York.Google Scholar
  18. Quine, W. V.: 1969a, ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, in Quine (1969), pp. 69–90.Google Scholar
  19. Quine, W. V.: 1969b, ‘Natural Kinds’, in Quine (1969), pp. 114–38.Google Scholar
  20. Quine, W. V.: 1974,The Roots of Reference, Open Court, La Salle, IL.Google Scholar
  21. Quine, W. V.: 1975, ‘The Nature of Natural Knowledge’, in Guttenplan (1975), pp. 67–81.Google Scholar
  22. Quine, W.V.: 1981,Theories and Things, Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, and London.Google Scholar
  23. Quine, W. V.: 1981a, ‘Russell's Ontological Development’, in Quine (1981), pp. 73–85.Google Scholar
  24. Quine, W. V.: 1981b, ‘Things and their Place in Theories’, in Quine (1981), pp. 1–23.Google Scholar
  25. Quine, W. V.: 1981c, ‘Responses’, in Quine (1981), pp. 173–86.Google Scholar
  26. Quine, W. V.: 1986a, ‘Reply to Putnam’, in Hahn and Schilpp (1986), pp. 427–31.Google Scholar
  27. Quine, W. V.: 1986b, ‘Reply to White’, in Hahn and Schilpp (1986), pp. 663–65.Google Scholar
  28. Quine, W. V. and J. Ullian: 1970,The Web of Belief, Random House, New York (1978: 2nd ed.).Google Scholar
  29. Siegel, H.: 1980, ‘Justification, Discovery and the Naturalization of Epistemology’,Philosophy of Science 47, 297–320.Google Scholar
  30. Sosa, E.: 1980, ‘The Raft and the Pyramid’, inMidwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. V, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, pp. 3–25.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Susan Haack
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MiamiCoral GablesU.S.A.

Personalised recommendations