Studia Logica

, Volume 54, Issue 3, pp 391–410 | Cite as

A complete minimal logic of the propositional contents of thought

  • Marek Nowak
  • Daniel Vanderveken


Our purpose is to formulate a complete logic of propositions that takes into account the fact that propositions are both senses provided with truth values and contents of conceptual thoughts. In our formalization, propositions are more complex entities than simple functions from possible worlds into truth values. They have a structure of constituents (a content) in addition to truth conditions. The formalization is adequate for the purposes of the logic of speech acts. It imposes a stronger criterion of propositional identity than strict equivalence. Two propositions P and Q are identical if and only if, for any illocutionary force F, it is not possible to perform with success a speech act of the form F(P) without also performing with success a speech act of the form F(Q). Unlike hyperintensional logic, our logic of propositions is compatible with the classical Boolean laws of propositional identity such as the symmetry and the associativity of conjunction and the reduction of double negation.


Mathematical Logic Truth Condition Simple Function Computational Linguistic Propositional Content 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marek Nowak
    • 1
  • Daniel Vanderveken
    • 2
  1. 1.University of ŁódźPoland
  2. 2.Université du QuébecCanada

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