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Journal of Logic, Language and Information

, Volume 4, Issue 4, pp 301–315 | Cite as

Interpreted logical forms as objects of the attitudes

  • M. Dusche
Article
  • 55 Downloads

Abstract

Two arguments favoring propositionalist accounts of attitude sentences are being revisited: the Church-Langford translation argument and Thomason's argument against quotational theories of indirect discourse. None of them proves to be decisive, thus leaving the option of searching for a developed quotational alternative. Such an alternative is found in an interpreted logical form theory of attitude ascription. The theory differentiates elegantly among different attitudes but it fails to account for logical dependencies among them. It is argued, however, that the concept of logical consequence does not well apply to dependencies among belief sentences and that the requirement to account for logical relations among such sentences should be relaxed.

Key words

Translation argument quotational theories of indirect discourse interpreted logical forms logic of propositional attitudes 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Dusche
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophische FakultätUniversität TübingenTübingen-LustnauGermany

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