Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 23, Issue 5, pp 451–494 | Cite as

Reconciling Austinian and Russellian accounts of the Liar paradox

  • Paul John King
Article

Keywords

Liar Paradox Russellian Account 
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References

  1. Aczel, Peter.Non-Well-Founded Sets. CSLI Lecture Notes. Stanford, California. 1988.Google Scholar
  2. Austin, John L. “Truth”. InProceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supp. vol. xxiv. 1950. Reprinted in Austin, John L. (ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock).Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press. Oxford, England. 1961.Google Scholar
  3. Barwise, Jon.The Situation in Logic. CSLI Lecture Notes. Stanford, California. 1988.Google Scholar
  4. Barwise, Jon, and John Etchemendy.The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity. Oxford University Press. Oxford, England. 1987.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul John King

There are no affiliations available

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