Public Choice

, Volume 77, Issue 1, pp 163–176 | Cite as

Epistemic choice and public choice

  • Vincent Ostrom
Article

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vincent Ostrom
    • 1
  1. 1.Workshop in Political Theory and Policy AnalysisIndiana UniversityBloomington

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