Public Choice

, Volume 79, Issue 3–4, pp 213–245 | Cite as

The VP-function: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years

  • Peter Nannestad
  • Martin Paldam


VP-functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables. Most studies analyze macro time series. We also cover studies of individual voters, socio-economic groups and regional cross-sections. The theory starts from the Responsibility Hypothesis: voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions. It works in two party/block systems, but not else. Voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic. Egotropic voting also occurs. Voters' myopia is well established. Voting is retrospective as expectations are static. It costs the average government almost 2% of the vote to rule.


Time Series Economic Condition Public Finance Myopia Political Variable 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Nannestad
    • 1
  • Martin Paldam
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute of Political ScienceAarhus UniversityÅrhus CDenmark
  2. 2.Institute of EconomicsAarhus UniversityÅrhus CDenmark

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