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Public Choice

, Volume 83, Issue 1–2, pp 173–184 | Cite as

How to pay for the peace? A theoretical framework with references to African countries

  • Jean-Paul Azam
Article

Abstract

This paper analyses a simple game-theoretic model to highlight the choice of the government between raising its defence expenditures or giving away some “gifts” to his opponents, as a means to defend his position in power. If the government is a Cournot-Nash player, then there is no gift in equilibrium, and any increase in the budget will lead to more inefficient defence expenditures. However, if the government is a Stackelberg-leader, then he will use the “gift” as a tool in his policy for staying in power.

Keywords

African Country Public Finance Paper Analyse Defence Expenditure Inefficient Defence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean-Paul Azam
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.CERDI, University of AuvergneClermont-FerrandFrance
  2. 2.CSAEOxford

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