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Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games

  • M. Breton
  • A. Alj
  • A. Haurie
Contributed Papers

Abstract

The concept of sequential Stackelberg equilibrium is introduced in the general framework of dynamic, two-person games defined in the Denardo contracting operator formalism. A relationship between this solution concept and the sequential Nash equilibrium for an associated extended game is established. This correspondence result, which can be related to previous results obtained by Başar and Haurie (1984), is then used for studying the existence of such solutions in a class of sequential games. For the zero-sum case, the sequential Stackelberg equilibrium corresponds to a sequential maxmin equilibrium. An algorithm is proposed for the computation of this particular case of equilibrium.

Key Words

Stackelberg equilibrium sequential games dynamic programming 

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Copyright information

© Plenum Publishing Corporation 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Breton
    • 1
  • A. Alj
    • 1
  • A. Haurie
    • 1
  1. 1.GERAD, Ecole des Hautes Etudes CommercialesMontréalCanada

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