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The sequence method for finding solutions to infinite games: A first demonstrating example

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A noncooperative infinite game can be approached by a sequence of discrete games. For each game in the sequence, a Nash solution can be found as well as their limit. This idea and procedure was used before as a theoretical device to prove existence of solutions to games with continuous payoffs and recently even for a class of games with discontinuous ones (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1981). No one, however, used the method for the actual solution of a game. Here, an example demonstrates the method's usefulness in finding a solution to a two-person game on the unit square with discontinuous payoff functions.

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    Bjork, T.,On the Existence of Equilibrium Points for Certain n-Person Games, FOA Reports, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1973.

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    Shilony, Y.,Mixed Pricing in Oligopoly, University of California, Berkeley, PhD Dissertation, 1975.

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    Dasgupta, P., andMaskin, E.,The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory, London School of Economics, ICERD Discussion Paper, 1982.

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    Shilony, Y.,Mixed Pricing in Oligopoly, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 14, pp. 373–388, 1977.

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The author wishes to thank D. McFadden for very useful discussions. Financial support was provided in part by NSF Grant No. SOC-72-05551A02 to the University of California, Berkeley, California.

Communicated by Y. C. Ho

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Shilony, Y. The sequence method for finding solutions to infinite games: A first demonstrating example. J Optim Theory Appl 46, 105–117 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00938764

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Key Words

  • Game theory
  • infinite games
  • discrete approximations