Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
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The Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games is a reasonable solution concept for games where, either due to lack of information on the part of one player about the performance function of the other, or due to different speeds in computing the strategies, or due to differences in size or strength, one player dominates the entire game by imposing a solution which is favorable to himself. This paper discusses some properties of this solution concept when the players use controls that are functions of the state variables of the game in addition to time. The difficulties in determining such controls are also pointed out. A simple two-stage finite state discrete game is used to illustrate these properties.
KeywordsNash ProPol Admissible Control Feedback Strategy Matrix Game
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