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Performance bounds for hierarchical systems under partial dynamic information

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Abstract

This paper discusses a general approach to obtain optimum performance bounds for (N+1)-person deterministic decision problems,N+1>2, with several levels of hierarchy and under partial dynamic information. Both cooperative and noncooperative modes of decision making are considered at the lower levels of hierarchy; in each case, it is shown that the optimum performance of the decision maker at the top of the hierarchy can be obtained by solving a sequence of open-loop (static) optimization problems. A numerical example included in the paper illustrates the general approach.

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Additional information

This work was sponsored in part by the US Air Force under Grant AFOSR-78-3633 and in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. ECS-79-19396.

Communicated by J. B. Cruz, Jr.

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Başar, T. Performance bounds for hierarchical systems under partial dynamic information. J Optim Theory Appl 39, 67–87 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00934606

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Key Words

  • Hierarchical decision problems
  • dynamic games
  • partial dynamic information
  • Stackelberg solutions
  • Nash solutions
  • Pareto-optimal solutions