Journal for General Philosophy of Science

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 323–326 | Cite as

Pseudoscience as structurally flawed practice: A reply to A.A. Derksen

  • Andrew Lugg


I respond to two criticisms levelled by A. A. Derksen in a recent issue of this journal against characterizing pseudoscience as structurally flawed practice: I argue that he surreptitiously invokes this conception, his official view that we should concentrate on pseudoscientists' pretensions rather than their practices notwithstanding; and I critically examine his contention that judgements of scientificity (and pseudoscientificity) cannot properly be made independently of a consideration of whether the relevant theories and practices are empirically well-confirmed.

Key words

pseudoscience A. A. Derksen epistemology 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrew Lugg
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of OttawaOttawaCanada

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