Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 1, Issue 4, pp 245–250 | Cite as

The Liberal Paradox: A generalisation

  • D. Kelsey
Article
Received:
Accepted:

Abstract

A largely unsolved problem in economics is what criteria should an economic policy satisfy to be desirable. The Pareto principle is the most widely used normative criterion in economics. Some recent criticisms have suggested that it is not compatible with other objectives of economic policy, most significantly that the Pareto principle conflicts with the respect of individual rights. This paper argues that the Pareto principle is not a significant cause of this conflict. Our argument is based upon a simple generalisation of the Liberal Paradox.

Keywords

Economic Theory Economic Policy Unsolved Problem Recent Criticism Simple Generalisation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • D. Kelsey
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsSouthern Methodist UniversityDallasUSA

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