Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 1, Issue 2, pp 127–147 | Cite as

Generalized condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences

  • H. Moulin
Article

Abstract

When preferences are single peaked the choice functions that are independent of irrelevant alternatives both in Nash's and in Arrow's sense are characterized. They take the Condorcet winner of the n individual peaks plus at most n-1 fixed ballots (phantom voters). These choice functions are also coalitionally strategy-proof.

Next the domain of individual preferences is enlarged to allow for singleplateau preferences: again, Nash's IIA and Arrow's IIA uniquely characterize a class of generalized Condorcet winners choice functions. These are, again, coalitionally strategy-proof.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • H. Moulin
    • 1
  1. 1.CepremapParisFrance

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