Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp 43–62 | Cite as

An interview with Kenneth J. Arrow

  • J. S. Kelly
Article

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. S. Kelly
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsSyracuse UniversitySyracuseUSA

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