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Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules

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Abstract

“Independence of clones” is a generalization of the condition of not being subject to the perverse consequences of vote splitting that arise under plurality voting. A new voting rule that is at least “almost always” independent of clones is obtained by the following algorithm: Require the collective ranking of the candidates to be consistent with the paired comparisons decided by the largest and second largest margins, and then, if possible, with the paired comparison decided by the third largest margin, and so on. The advantages of this “ranked pairs” rule over previously proposed voting rules that are independent of clones is that it possesses Condorcet consistency, non-negative responsiveness, and “resolvability” (the property that every tie be within one vote of being broken).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 24061, Blacksburg, VA, USA

    T. N. Tideman

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  1. T. N. Tideman
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Additional information

I am indebted to Jaques Crémer, Amoz Kats, Martin Ricketts, Thomas Schwartz and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions.

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Tideman, T.N. Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules. Soc Choice Welfare 4, 185–206 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433944

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433944

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