Synthese

, Volume 70, Issue 1, pp 79–96 | Cite as

On some fundamental distinctions of computationalism

  • William Demopoulos
Cognitive Science

Abstract

The following paper presents a characterization of three distinctions fundamental to computationalism, viz., the distinction between analog and digital machines, representation and nonrepresentation-using systems, and direct and indirect perceptual processes. Each distinction is shown to rest on nothing more than the methodological principles which justify the explanatory framework of the special sciences.

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • William Demopoulos
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Western OntarioLondonCanada

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