, Volume 108, Issue 2, pp 205–267 | Cite as


  • I. L. Humberstone


Several intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions amongst properties, current in the literature, are discussed and contrasted. The proponents of such distinctions tend to present them as competing, but it is suggested here that at least three of the relevant distinctions (including here that between non-relational and relational properties) arise out of separate perfectly legitimate intuitive considerations: though of course different proposed explications of the informal distinctions involved in any one case may well conflict. Special attention is paid to the question of whether a single notion of property is capable of supporting the various distinctions.


Relational Property Relevant Distinction Intuitive Consideration Single Notion 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • I. L. Humberstone
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyMonash UniversityClayton, MelbourneAustralia

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