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Journal of Consumer Policy

, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 1–27 | Cite as

Exit, voice, and collective action in Swedish consumer policy

  • Victor A. Pestoff
Articles

Abstract

The development of consumer influence in Sweden is characterized by successive phases of initiation (1940–1953), expansion (1954–1971), consolidation (1972–1977), retrenchment (1978–1984), and decentralization (since 1985). For the study of consumer policy, the concepts of exit and voice, collective action, countervailing power, and integrated participation are used.

It is shown that consumer policy neither belongs exclusively to the public domain, nor is simply left to the whims of the market. Its success depends in part on the participation of non-governmental organizations. However, the state's presence is essential for the survival of “organized consumer interests” as a countervailing power.

Keywords

Economic Policy Collective Action Public Domain Successive Phasis Consumer Policy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

List of acronyms used in this article

ARN

Allmänna reklamationsnämnden — the Public Merchandise Complaints Board

HFI

Hemmens forskningsinstitut — the Institute of Home Research

HSB

Hyresgästernas Sparkasse- och Byggnadsföreningars Riksförbund — the National Association of Tenants' Savings and Building Societies

ICA

Inköpscentralernas Aktiebolag

KI

Konsumentinstitutet — the Institute for Consumer Information

KF

Kooperativa Förbundet — the Cooperative Union and Wholesale Society

KoV

Konsumentverket — the National Board for Consumer Policies

KPK

Konsumentpolitiska kommittén — the Committee on Consumer Policy

KR

Konsumentrådet — the National Council for Consumer Goods Research and Consumer Information

LO

Landsorganisationen i Sverige — the Swedish Trade Union Confederation

LRF

Lantbrukarnas riksförbund — the Federation of Swedish Farmers

MD

Marknadsdomstolen — the Market Court

M SEK

Million Swedish crowns

NO

Näringsfrihetsombudsmannen — the Competition Ombudsman

NR

Näringsfrihetsrådet — the Competition Council

OECD

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OK

Oljekonsumenternas Förbund — the Swedish Oil Consumers' Union

PRO

Pensionärernas Riksorganisation — the Swedish Pensioners' National Organization

SACO/SR

Centralorganisationen — the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations, SACO/SR

SAF

Svenska arbetsgivareföreningen — the Swedish Employers' Confederation

SEK

Swedish crowns

SHIO

Sveriges Hantverks- och Industriorganisation — the Swedish Federation of Crafts and Small and Medium-Sized Industries

SI

Sveriges Industriförbund — the Federation of Swedish Industries

SJN

Statens jordbruksnämnd — the National Agricultural Marketing Board

SLV

Statens livsmedelsverk — the National Food Administration

SPK

Statens pris- och kartellnämnd — the National Price and Cartel Office

TCO

Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation — the Central Organization of Salaried Employees

VDN

Varudeklarationsnämnden — the Institute for Informative Labelling

Abwanderung, Widerspruch und kollektives Handeln in der schwedischen Verbraucherpolitik

Zusammenfassung

Der Beitrag kennzeichnet die Entwicklung des Verbrauchereinflusses in Schweden durch mehrere Phasen. Danach liegt die Anfangsphase in den Jahren 1940 bis 1953; in die anschließenden Jahre bis 1971 fällt die Phase der Expansion; die Phase der Konsolidierung fällt in die Jahre 1972 bis 1977, die des Abbaues in die anschließenden Jahre bis 1984, und die Zeit seit 1985 wird als Dezentralisationsphase bezeichnet.

Bei der Analyse der schwedischen Verbraucherpolitik werden die theoretischen Konzepte (a) von Abwanderung und Widerspruch, (b) des kollektiven Handelns, (c) der Gegenmachtbildung und (d) der integrierten Mitwirkung verwendet.

Es wird gezeigt, daß die Verbraucherpolitik weder ausschließlich dem öffentlichen Bereich zugehört, noch den Launen des Marktes unterliegen kann. Ihr Erfolg setzt zumindest teilweise die Mitwirkung von nichtstaatlichen Organisationen voraus. Allerdings ist staatliche Unterstützung notwendig für das Überleben des “organisierten Verbraucherinteresses” als Gegenmacht.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Victor A. Pestoff

There are no affiliations available

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