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Archive for History of Exact Sciences

, Volume 46, Issue 4, pp 367–383 | Cite as

An interpretation of Peano's logic

  • Evgeny A. Zaitsev
Article

Summary

The problem of an adequate interpretation of G. Peano's logic still remains open, largely due to its striking pecularities:
  1. (i)

    the use of the same notation to designate relations both between classes and propositions;

     
  2. (ii)

    the lack of precision in his understanding of propositional functions as distinct from propositions;

     
  3. (iii)

    the systematic use of conditional definitions.

     

In this paper an attempt is made to explain these apparent shortcomings in the light of Peano's confusion between the logical calculus and its metatheory. In addition, the influence of traditional subject-predicate logic in Peano's writings is analysed. The focus of the study is Peano's representation of singular propositions and relations by means of his newly introduced sign of membership.

Keywords

Singular Proposition Propositional Function Adequate Interpretation Logical Calculus Conditional Definition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Evgeny A. Zaitsev
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of the History of MathematicsInstitute for the History of Science & TechnologyMoscow

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